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Governance Models for Interoperable Electronic 
Identities  
Tobias Mahler1 
Abstract: Current implementations of electronic identity in Europe are rather 
diverse; they include state-driven identity management frameworks as well as private sector 
frameworks and different forms of public-private collaborations. This diversity may 
represent a major challenge for the deployment of information society services addressed 
towards the European internal market. This raises the question: How can we achieve 
interoperability of electronic identities across Europe, and potentially beyond Europe’s 
borders? This paper argues that the interoperability of electronic identity could be governed 
by a multi-stakeholder governance framework that brings together different parties with 
interests in the provision and use of electronic identities. Such a governance framework 
could, for example, consist in designing and operating a portal with common functionalities 
that allows interoperable authentication across multiple domains and contexts. Inspiration 
for the governance of such a portal could come both from existing successful 
implementations of electronic identity and from multi-stakeholder institutions that have 
proven useful in Internet governance.  
Introduction 
Interoperable electronic identity (eID) is often considered a necessary ingredient of cross-border 
interactions and transactions over the Internet. Anyone building a framework for interoperable eIDs needs 
to address a wide array of issues, including the choice of a technical framework, the context for which 
eIDs shall be used (e.g., eGovernment, eBusiness, or both) and the selection or development of a suitable 
legal framework. Many of these issues are, in practice, dependent on and intertwined with the institutional 
arrangements put in place to govern the eID framework. For example, amongst the interesting legal issues 
is the liability of actors involved in the provision and use of eIDs. 2 The liability of parties to an eID 
framework depends evidently, in part, on the roles of the collaborators and their legal status. Similarly, 
the provision and use of eIDs needs to comply with legal requirements—for example, under data 
protection law—and ensuring compliance may have to be organised across a network of collaborating 
parties. 
Identity management3 systems are currently implemented in a variety of governance structures and 
models in Europe. This spans from primarily state-driven eIDs to different degrees of public-private 
collaborations and private sector solutions.  The private sector’s involvement is not necessarily surprising, 
because both private and public entities might, in principle, play a role in the provision and use of eIDs. 
Besides, the key role of the private sector in eID innovation is beyond question. While the variety of 
implementations and governance models in Europe may be seen as a challenge for interoperability, it 
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could also be viewed as an illustration of some of the breadth of available options and solutions for the 
future governance of eID in Europe and beyond. This paper discusses a few basic models for the 
governance of eID and exemplifies these based on selected examples of existing European eID 
implementations. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 1 introduces the concept of eID and the roles 
involved in issuing and using interoperable eIDs. This paper focuses primarily on interoperable eID in a 
European context. Therefore, Section 2 provides a very brief outline of the European legal framework for 
eID. However, the main interest of this paper does not centre on the legal issues as such, but on the 
governance of interoperable eIDs. Therefore, Section 3 introduces the concept of governance; Section 4 
discusses the governance of other identifiers—such as domain names, and Section 5 explains how 
interoperable eID can be framed as a governance challenge. The paper then turns towards the core of eID 
governance. In this context we can make a rough distinction between eID provision and use. The 
subsequent Sections (6, 7 and 8) focus on eID provision and describe three basic models of eID provision, 
respectively based on public, private and public-private governance structures. When eIDs are offered 
based on very dissimilar governance structures, this may result in a rather heterogeneous picture, which 
may be challenging in terms of interoperability. Therefore, Section 9 focuses on the governance of 
interoperability itself. One solution to the problems of inconsistent and diverging eIDs may be to create 
an intermediary agency (an authentication authority) that is able to handle interoperability problems 
directly. This approach, as well as its governance challenges, is explained based on a concrete example of 
an eID portal. The concluding Section 10 argues that the latter model could potentially be employed to 
address eID interoperability not only at the European level, but also in a wider context.   
1. eID and interoperability 
The need for eID arises in part from the fact that the Internet is designed to be somewhat agnostic to the 
identity of its users. Domain names and IP numbers are machine identifiers, rather than identifiers of 
persons, even though personal identification may be possible.4  Therefore, we use identifiers such as e-
mail addresses or user names to identify a person. An eID can be the basis for different functions, in 
particular authentication and signature.5 We are here particularly interested in eIDs that can be used for 
authentication purposes. A relying party can authenticate a claimed identity by examining one or more 
authenticators (such as passwords or other credentials) to verify the legitimate use of an identifier (e.g., a 
user name).6 Different eIDs may vary in their level of assurance, depending on certain security aspects of 
the authenticator(s). 
The notion of eID is here not used as a precisely defined technical concept; the IT literature usually 
applies a more specific taxonomy.7 However, it can be based on the technical notion of “identity” in the 
sense of “any subset of attribute values of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this 
individual person within any set of persons”.8 The use of eIDs in identity management systems can be 
distinguished from directory services that provide some information connected to an identifier. Directory 
services are not designed to facilitate either authentication or signature. An example of a directory service 
is the WHOIS service, which provides information about the technical and administrative points of 
contact administering domain names.9  Mueller and Chango have described the WHOIS service as a 
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 See, e.g., P. Lundevall-Unger and T. Tranvik, "IP Addresses–Just a Number?," International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 19, no. 1 (2011). Moreover, it may be possible to use a URL as an identifier of an eID, as 
foreseen in the W3C specification “WebID 1.0: Web Identification and Discovery”, W3C Editor's Draft, 17 October 
2011, available at http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/ (last visited 10 November 2011). 
5
 Regarding electronic signatures, see Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, p. 12 (e-Signatures 
Directive). 
6
 Clarke, "Identity Management," 3. Authentication is closely related to, but needs to be distinguished from, 
authorization, i.e., the decision about an authenticated user’s privileges. 
7
 A. Pfitzmann and M. Hansen, "A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, 
Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management," (version v0.34, 2010). 
8
 See ibid., 30. 
9
 Cf., e.g., Article 16 (1) of Regulation (EC) No. 874/2004. See further D.I. Cojocarasu, "Legal Issues Regarding 
WHOIS Databases," (Oslo: Senter for rettsinformatikk, 2009). 
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“surrogate identity system:” 10 The data in the WHOIS record is as close as the Internet gets to an identity 
card.11 The WHOIS service is not aimed at authentication, even though it may play a central role for the 
creation of trust on the Internet, particularly when combined with adequate security mechanisms.12 
Despite this potential similarity in function, the primary focus of this paper is not on directory 
services, but on eIDs.13 At the same time, we cannot delve into the details of eID technologies, because 
the centre of attention is on the governance of eIDs. We are particularly interested in eIDs that allow an 
identity holder to use an interoperable eID in an identity management framework spanning across 
multiple contexts, such as those of eBusiness and eGovernment. This use and re-use of eIDs within 
different contexts requires some degree of interoperability, both in the sense of technical standardisation14 
and in terms of organisational collaboration.15 Strongly simplified, technical interoperability implies, for 
example, that an eID issued by one actor (e.g., the identity provider) can be understood and used by 
another actor (e.g., a relying party). This is usually embedded in some kind of identity management 
framework, which may require quite complex organizational collaboration. For example, the issuing of an 
eID may involve collaboration between a registration authority (enrolling the eID holder), an identity 
provider (who may issue the eID itself, or on whose behalf the eID is issued) and an agency that 
distributes the eID (for example, on a smart card). Similarly, the use of an eID could involve not only 
relying parties, but also authentication authorities16 and perhaps even further intermediaries and service 
providers.  
The governance framework has to address both the provision and the use of interoperable eIDs:17 
First, one needs to ensure that eIDs are created and issued through a collaboration of registration 
authorities, identity providers, and possible distributors. This corresponds to the eID registration phase. 
Second, there are governance issues related to the use of eIDs during the authentication phase. 
Interoperability is of particular importance for the latter phase. There may be many ways to ensure 
interoperability, but this paper will focus on institutional solutions involving an intermediary, in particular 
an authentication authority (see Section 9).  
2. The European legal framework for eID 
Any framework for eID has to be related to, and comply with, the applicable legal framework. This 
section will briefly note a few European legal instruments that may be at least partly relevant to the 
provision and use of interoperable eIDs. In principle, interoperability of eIDs is not only a European 
issue; it can indeed be seen as a global challenge. Nevertheless, within the European discourse about eID 
it may be prudent to focus on a European solution initially, because an interoperable eID in Europe would 
be a particularly useful facilitator for the European internal market and for eGovernment in Europe. 
Indeed, interoperability of eIDs has been identified as a key challenge for eGovernment and for some 
aspects of eBusiness in Europe.18 One of the elements in that discussion is whether Europe currently lacks 
                                                 
10
 Milton Mueller and Mawaki Chango, "Disrupting Global Governance: The Internet Whois Service, ICANN, and 
Privacy," Journal of Information Technology & Politics 5, no. 3 (2008): 304. 
11
 Ibid., 310. 
12
 An example of such security mechanisms are Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), based on 
specifications for securing certain kinds of information provided by the Domain Name System.  See, e.g., 
https://www.iana.org/dnssec/.   
13
 However, such directory services can be a useful basis for comparing governance models, as shown below in 
Section 4. 
14
 See generally on interoperability Laura DeNardis, Opening standards: the global politics of interoperability, The 
information society series (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011). 
15
 See, e.g., Thomas Olsen and Tobias Mahler, "Identity Management and Data Protection Law: Risk, Responsibility 
and Compliance in 'Circles of Trust'," Computer Law & Security Report 23, no. 4+5 (2007). 
16
 On authentication providers see R. Leenes et al., "D.2.2 — Report on Legal Interoperability," (Stork eID 
Consortium, 2009), 23-27. 
17
 Ibid., 24-25. 
18
 N. N. G. de Andrade, "Towards a European eID regulatory framework. The Legal Gaps, Barriers and Challenges of 
Constructing a Legal Framework for the Protection and Management of Electronic Identities," in European Data 
Protection: In Good Health?, ed. S. Gutwirth, et al. (Springer, 2012 - forthcoming). 
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an adequate regulatory framework for eID.19 What may be called “the legal framework” consists of a 
patchwork of partly relevant rules in several legal instruments, including at least the EU electronic 
signature directive20 and the data protection directives.21 Thus, all identity management systems must 
comply with the applicable data protection laws.22 In complex identity management systems consisting of 
several collaborating parties, this requires a number of potentially difficult assessments, such as who is 
acting as a data controller and who is a data processor.23 For example, in a series of cases before the 
Norwegian Data Protection Agency, the latter body questioned a number of operational details in a 
Norwegian eID system utilized in the eGovernment context.24 The agency’s criticism related not only to 
insufficiently clarified roles of participants, but also to whether there existed sufficient legal basis for all 
aspects of the processing of personal data. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these issues in 
any detail.  
However, it may be in order to highlight one minor aspect of the legal framework that is usually 
omitted from legal discussions about eIDs—perhaps for a good reason. This relates to the fact that the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications was in 2009 extended with explicit rules about 
“identity services” related to electronic communications. These rules may not be directly applicable to 
eIDs used for eBusiness or eGovernment services (as shown below), because the rules focus on the 
underlying communications network, rather than on the services. However, these rules are nevertheless of 
interest here, if only to illustrate the possibility of focusing on competition in the eID context. Readers 
without specific interest in the EU legal framework may consider skipping the remainder of this section 
and continuing directly with Section 3 below. 
In order to understand “identity services” related to electronic communications, we need to briefly 
outline their legal context. In 2009, the “Better Regulation” Directive25 introduced the notion of 
“associated services” into the electronic communications Framework Directive.26 According to Article 2 
(ea) of the amended Framework Directive, associated services include, inter alia, “identity, location and 
presence service” (emphasis added). Identity services are not defined in the Directive or elsewhere in the 
electronic communications framework, but “identity” is in the electronic communications context 
                                                 
19
 The lack of “an appropriate regulation regarding eID on a European level” was ascertained by T. Myhr, "Legal and 
organizational challenges and solutions for achieving a pan-European electronic ID solution:: or I am 621216-1318, 
but I am also 161262-43774.1 Do you know who I am?," Information Security Technical Report 13, no. 2 (2008): 77. 
Concurring with this view de Andrade, "Towards a European eID regulatory framework. The Legal Gaps, Barriers 
and Challenges of Constructing a Legal Framework for the Protection and Management of Electronic Identities," 
Section I.4.5. 
20
 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, p. 12 (e-Signatures Directive). 
21Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection 
Directive), L 281 , 23/11/1995, p. 0031 – 0050; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ 2002-07-31, L 201, pp. 37 – 47, as 
amended. 
22
 See further Olsen and Mahler, "Identity Management and Data Protection Law: Risk, Responsibility and 
Compliance in 'Circles of Trust'."; Thomas Olsen, "Personvernøkende identitetsforvaltning" (University of Oslo, 
2010). 
23
 According to the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (above, note21), Article 2 (d) 'controller' shall mean the 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined 
by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be 
designated by national or Community law. According to Article 2 (e) of the same Directive, 'processor' shall mean a 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the 
controller. 
24
 The Norwegian Data Protection Agency (Datatilsynet), control reports 08/00291and 08/00297; decisions “Altinn 
sentralforvaltning” (2008) and “Skattedirektoratet og Altinn (2008). For an overview of these cases see Olsen, 
"Personvernøkende identitetsforvaltning," 165 et seq. 
25
 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC 
on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 337/37. 
26
 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
OJ L 108 of 24.4.2002.  
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sometimes used in the context of caller identification, which is perhaps closest to a directory service as 
described above. In general, the concept of “associated services” is relevant because it triggers the 
authority and obligation of national regulatory authorities to promote competition in the provision of 
electronic communications services and associated services.27 Moreover, pursuant to the Access 
Directive, operators with significant market power may be required to provide access to associated 
services, including identity services.28 
However, despite the initial similarity of terminology, it is not certain that these rules will apply to the 
typical eID services used in eGovernment and eBusiness, because these would typically qualify as so-
called information society services.29 This is important because, in order to qualify as an associated 
service under the Framework Directive, the service has to be associated with an electronic 
communications service—i.e., it needs to be related to the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks, which explicitly excludes information society services such as eBusiness and 
eGovernment.30 Thus, the provisions on “identity services” in the electronic communications context 
would probably not be directly applicable to the context of eIDs in eBusiness and eGovernment. eIDs are 
usually offered by actors involved in either eBusiness or eGovernment, with no particular role in the 
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks. It remains to be seen how these rules will 
be applied to identity management systems operated by, e.g., telecoms operators. 
However, these rules can serve here at least to illustrate the competition aspect of eIDs. Competition 
in a market for eIDs is indeed one of the relevant governance issues related to interoperable eIDs.  
3. Governance  
The problems of interoperability and competition in the eID context are here portrayed as governance 
challenges. The aim of this section is to briefly introduce the concept of governance, particularly in an 
Internet context. 
Governance can be defined as a process of steering.31 Its etymological origins include the ancient 
Greek word kybernan and the Latin gubernare, ‘to steer’ as well as kybernetes, “pilot” or “helmsman.” 
Thus, the double nature of both (i) the act of governing and (ii) the role of a governor are relevant to 
understand the concept. However, while governance may involve an authority relationship, this is not 
necessary by definition. Governance can take many forms, it can be carried out alone or collaboratively, 
top-down or bottom-up, and may exists across levels of social organization, e.g. at intra-organizational, 
national, European or global levels. 
Of particular relevance for the eID context is Internet Governance. This can be defined based on the 
following working definition, drafted by the UN-appointed Working Group on Internet Governance and 
included in the Tunis Agenda adopted by the World Summit on Information Society:  
 
“Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
                                                 
27
 See Article 8 (2) of Directive 2002/21/EC (note 26 above). In any case, a NRA has in practice to balance several 
aims, including, for example, consumer protection and competition. Thus, this provision may not in itself be 
sufficient to require NRAs to prioritize competition.  
28
 See Article 12 (1) (j) Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive), as 
amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (note 25 above). 
29
 Information society services are defined as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by 
electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services” in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998, laying down a procedure for the provision of information in 
the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 24, 21.7.1998, p. 
37.  
30
 See Article 2 (c) of Directive 2002/21/EC (note 26 above). 
31
 This definition, its historical origins and connotations are based on William J. Drake, "Introduction: The 
Distributed Architecture of Network Global Governance," in Governing global electronic networks: International 
perspectives on policy and power, ed. William J. Drake and Ernest J. Wilson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 7 
et seq. 
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decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet.”32 
 
Central for this definition is the focus on the role of multiple stakeholders, including governments, the 
private sector and civil society. This multi-stakeholder focus is of particular relevance to the Internet, 
which has historically evolved with very limited involvement by states. While the discussion about multi-
stakeholderism is still continuing in international fora, many of the key elements of the Internet are at the 
time of writing governed by an institutional ecosystem that facilitates a high degree of influence for 
different stakeholders.33 For the purposes of the present paper, it is particularly interesting to note that 
Internet governance focuses, inter alia, on governing identifiers. 
4. Governance mechanisms for identifiers 
Amongst the basic functions of an eID is to identify a person. This identification function is interesting 
when we compare it to other identifiers, such as domain names and telephone numbers. My conjecture is 
that the spectrum of governance models in use for other identifiers might illustrate some of the available 
policy choices when designing an eID framework. Before we address the specific problems related to 
eID, we should therefore take a brief look at governance mechanisms used for other interoperable 
identifiers. 
The governance of domain name addresses and IP (Internet Protocol) numbers is amongst the key 
issues in global Internet governance. Both of these identifiers are governed by a dedicated institutional 
framework that is administrated primarily by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) and its supporting organizations.34 The most striking characteristic of this institutional 
framework is the substantial private sector influence, which is built into ICANN’s decision-making 
procedures. At the same time, the ICANN model illustrates the difficulties with agreeing on a global 
framework for identity-related services, i.e., the contact information available in the WHOIS directory 
service. At the time of writing ICANN is still struggling with a reform of the WHOIS system that 
adequately addresses issues such as data protection and law enforcement.35 
In addition, there are other identifiers of international relevance, such as radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags which are administered by the private sector36 and telephone numbers which are administered 
in part at national level—with substantial involvement of both national regulatory agencies and telecom 
operators—and in part at the international level under the auspices of the International 
Telecommunications Union—also with significant industry participation.  
In summary, the governance of other interoperable identifiers is carried out in a number of different 
institutional models. While many identifiers are governed by stakeholders from the private sector alone 
(e.g. RFIDs), other governance models involve some degree of collaboration between stakeholders. In 
some cases, such as telephone numbers, this involves collaboration between stakeholders from the private 
sector with governmental authorities. Such public-private cooperation may not be sufficient to justify the 
label “multi-stakeholder governance”, but there are also examples of the latter, where additional 
stakeholders such as end-users and civil society have some measure of influence. My argument in this 
                                                 
32
 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, World Summit on the Information Society, 18 November 2005, 
paragraph 34.   
33
 See, e.g., Lee A. Bygrave and Jon Bing, Internet Governance: Infrastructure and Institutions  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
34
 See, e.g., A.M. Froomkin, "Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a critical theory of cyberspace," Harvard Law 
Review 116, no. 3 (2003); Milton Mueller, Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace  
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). 
35
 See http://gnso.icann.org/issues/whois/policies. For the historical background see Mueller and Chango, "Disrupting 
Global Governance: The Internet Whois Service, ICANN, and Privacy." 
36
 See further http://www.gs1.org/epcglobal (last visited 20 September 2011). The discussion of RFID governance 
falls outside the scope of this paper. For a multi-stakeholder governance model for RFID see http://www.rfid-in-
action.eu/public/results/rfid-stakeholder-model (last visited 20 September 2011). The latter was created to achieve a 
structured model of all stakeholder groups that are relevant for the development, deployment and operation of RFID 
systems. 
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paper is that some of these governance models could be usefully applied to govern the development and 
use of interoperable eIDs. We might learn from successful governance models developed in other 
contexts and apply the lessons learned there to address some of the challenges with eID interoperability.  
5. Interoperable eID as a governance challenge 
If the interoperability of eIDs is recast as a governance challenge, it can be analysed in terms of the 
influence exercised by different stakeholders. A multi-stakeholder governance framework for eIDs would 
require that we first identify relevant stakeholders.   
Who are the stakeholders related to the issuing and use of an interoperable eID? The answer to this 
question may depend to some degree on the specific context, so this must here be addressed in the 
abstract. The starting point can be the above-mentioned roles typically related to an eID, i.e., identity 
holders, registration authorities, identity providers, authentication authorities, relying parties, and other 
possible intermediaries and service providers.37 Of particular interest are the roles of identity providers, 
registration authorities and authorization authorities, because these actors arguably have the greatest 
influence on the governance of an eID framework. At the same time, relying parties and identity holders 
should not be forgotten, as these two stakeholder groups are the primary “users” of eID. Moreover, a 
governance model should also include intermediaries with a core focus on interoperability, who might be 
able to address and manage some of the existing inconsistencies between different eID implementations 
(see further Section 9). 
Any of these roles can, in theory, be filled by a person from the public or private sector. Moreover, 
also end-users and civil society hold stakes in an eID system, and their interests should be represented in a 
full multi-stakeholder framework. However, in order to limit the scope of this paper, we shall here 
concentrate primarily on the roles of business and the public sector. 
We may roughly distinguish three very basic models of eID governance, namely: 
 
• public eID governance, 
• private eID governance, and 
• governance by public-private partnerships. 
 
Each sector brings with it the typical governance mechanisms. This is particularly evident when we 
focus on governance through legally binding rules. While private sector governance is limited to 
contractual governance, the public sector may in addition also employ legislative rule-making. Where the 
public and the private sectors collaborate on an equal footing, this usually implies some element of 
contractual governance. Of course, regardless of the specific governance model, any eID framework will 
obviously need to be operated within the context of the applicable laws. Thus, issues such as compliance 
with data protection law arise regardless of the chosen eID governance model.  
As mentioned above,38 we may distinguish between the governance of eID provision (the registration 
phase) and the governance of eID use (authentication phase), during which interoperability is essential. 
Any of the above three models could theoretically be applied to governance issues of both phases, as 
illustrated in                   Table 1. 
 
                  Table 1: eID provision and use within the three governance models 
eID provision and use: Public Private Public-private 
eID provision (registration phase) Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 
eID use (authentication phase) Section 9 
  
                                                 
37
 See Section 1. 
38
 See Section 1. 
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The following sections (6-8) present and exemplify the three above mentioned governance models 
based on selected aspects of eID provision in several European countries. These sections focus primarily 
on the institutional framework in place to govern the issuance of eIDs. Thereafter, Section 9 is dedicated 
to the governance of the authentication phase, with a particular focus on how interoperability of eIDs can 
be facilitated.  
6. Public eID provision 
The ideal type39 of public eID provision is a setting in which an eID is issued and administered by organs 
of a state. The classical example of this model is the role of a state issuing a passport or a citizen card. In 
this case, a public authority functions as a registration authority and the organ issuing the passport is the 
“identity provider”.  This model can, to some extent, be transposed into the Internet context.  
The German eID framework serves here as an example of an eID provided and governed by the public 
sector. In Germany, an eID can be included in the citizen card, which is at the same time an identification 
document in the off-line context.40 Thus, one of the eID’s functions is to resemble the identification in the 
off-line world, traditionally based on official documents such as passports. Just like the latter, the German 
eID could in principle be used both in a governmental context and for all other contexts where 
identification is needed. However, while anyone can read the physical ID card, not everyone can access 
the eID stored on it. Relying parties in eBusiness or eGovernment need a specific certificate, called an 
access certificate, to access the eID on the card. The access certificate also specifies what kinds of 
information may be communicated, such as the identity holder’s address or age. This eID framework does 
not seem to include any authentication authorities, as the authentication is either directly carried out by 
the relying party or outsourced to other parties.41  
The German eID governance framework is primarily of a public sector nature. The use of these eID is 
governed by the German act on personal identification cards and electronic identification.42 The card 
itself is issued by the authorities and produced by the Federal Printing Office “Bundesdruckerei”.  
It is not apparent that other stakeholders, such as the private sector or end-users, are directly 
participating in the governance of this eID. However, it is noteworthy that the German constitution was 
recently amended to introduce a collaborative framework involving both the federal government and the 
respective state governments (Länder) in the context of IT systems.43 This was the basis for establishing 
an IT planning council, which also includes representation from municipalities and the data protection 
authorities.44 Thus, there is collaboration between several stakeholders, but only from the public sector. 
While civil society and business interests are not formally represented, it follows from the strategy of the 
IT council that the involvement of these stakeholders should be increased.45 This could become relevant 
when the IT council will develop an eID strategy in the near future.46 
7. Private eID provision 
There are many examples of eIDs that are issued by the private sector. At the time of writing many 
companies rely on user-names and passwords that can only be used for internal purposes. Yet there is an 
                                                 
39
 An ideal type is an analytical construct that can be used to highlight specific features of real cases. 
40
 See, e.g., G. Hornung and A. Roßnagel, "An ID card for the Internet-The new German ID card with 'electronic 
proof of identity'," Computer Law & Security Review 26, no. 2 (2010). 
41
 See also Leenes et al., "D.2.2 — Report on Legal Interoperability," 81 et seq. On authentication authorities see 
further below, Section 9. 
42
 Gesetz über Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitätsnachweis, 18.06.2009. 
43
 See Article 91c of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). 
44
 For a general overview of the IT Planning Council see www.it-planungsrat.de (last visited 10 November 2011). 
45
 National E-Government Strategy, IT Planning Council decision of 24 September 2010, goal 12, page 12. The 
strategy is available from the Council’s website http://www.it-planungsrat.de (last visited 10 November 2011). 
46
 IT Planning Council, decision 2011/18. Interestingly the planning council notes explicitly that the eID strategy 
should involve the authorities at federal, state and municipal level, but makes no mention of civil society or business 
users of eID. 
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increasing use of interoperable private-sector eIDs, such as the option to authenticate a user based on 
credentials used in social networks like Facebook.47 The fact that Facebook at the same time relies on 
eIDs issued under the open standard OpenID48 illustrates that interoperability of private sector eIDs may 
go both ways. In other words, the identity provider for one eID may at the same time be a relying party 
accepting another eID, and both eIDs could be used interchangeably to authenticate users for certain 
contexts. Of particular interest for the present paper is the possibility to use such private sector eIDs in an 
eGovernment context.49  
In addition, in some European countries there is also a market for interoperable private-sector eIDs 
that offer a high level of security. Such eIDs can be offered, for example, on a smart card, and they may 
fulfil the security requirements for eGovernment in some countries. Such use raises, of course, specific 
governance issues related to the authentication phase, which will be further addressed below in Section 9. 
8. Public-private eID provision 
The third basic type of eID provision is based on different types of public-private partnerships. This 
approach was chosen for the provision of eIDs in several European countries, including Denmark and 
Austria. The Danish eID is offered by a public-private partnership based on consortium agreement 
amongst the collaborating parties and a contract with the end-user.50  
By comparison, the Austrian eID is based on the Austrian eID act and is provided with significant 
involvement of the Austrian government as well as the private sector. The details of this collaboration 
cannot be exhaustively presented here, but a brief and simplified summary may illustrate the essentials.51 
It is perhaps best to describe this collaboration by following the life-cycle of an eID. This starts with the 
registration phase, where a “certification service provider” is responsible for verifying the citizen’s 
identity as part of the registration procedure.  This entity also as requests a digital signature called an 
“identity link” from the register authority (public sector). While the identity provider is lastly the Austrian 
register authority, the issuers of the “Citizen Card” can be both private and public parties. Interestingly, 
the identity provider is consulted only during the issuance of the Citizen Card. During use of a Citizen 
Card, no identity provider is consulted, because only the identity link is used. 
9. Governance of eID interoperability 
So far we have focused primarily on the issuance of interoperable eIDs. We should now turn our attention 
to the governance of eID interoperability itself. The starting point for this is a situation where there is a 
multiplicity of available eIDs, as well as many potential relying parties. An example is the variety of eIDs 
currently available in Europe, which potentially could be used in eBusiness and eGovernment across 
Europe, but which currently cannot be used due to lacking interoperability. This lack of interoperability 
can have technical, organizational and legal dimensions, and it may to some degree be influenced by 
relying parties’ insufficient knowledge about existing eIDs and lack of trust for ID providers and other 
parties involved in issuing an eID. This raises the question whether it would be possible to design 
                                                 
47
 See Omer Tene, ”Me, Myself and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated Identities on Social Networking Services” in 
this issue. 
48
 See Luke Shepard, “Facebook Supports OpenID for Automatic Login”, Developer Blog, May 18, 2009, 
http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/246/.  OpenID is is a Web registration and single sign-on protocol that lets 
users register and login to OpenID-enabled websites using their own choice of OpenID identifier. It is offered by the 
OpenID Foundation, an international non-profit organization. See further www.openid.net. 
49
 D. Thibeau and R. Drummond, "Open trust frameworks for open government: Enabling citizen involvement 
through open identity technologies," in White paper, OpenID Foudation and Information Card Foudation (2009). 
50
 This eID solution is called “NemID” and its governance by the Danish banking sector and the National IT and 
Telecom Agency is briefly mentioned in English at https://www.nemid.nu/om_nemid/about_nemid/ and further 
explained in Danish at https://www.nemid.nu/om_nemid/hvad_er_nemid/parterne_bag_nemid/ (both last visited 10. 
November 2011). The organizational framework may change in the near future, because the agency will be 
discontinued by the recently elected Danish government.  
51
 For a more detailed account of the Austrian eID framework see Leenes et al., "D.2.2 — Report on Legal 
Interoperability," 49 et seq. 
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governance structures that could facilitate the interoperability of otherwise incompatible eIDs. Would it 
be possible to design a governance framework that could define policies for eID interoperability, perhaps 
even within a multi-stakeholder framework? Experiences with governance structures for other identifiers 
as well as existing models for eID interoperability indicate, in my view, that we should not necessarily 
disregard this possibility.  
The basic structure of such a governance framework would imply that an intermediary entity—an 
authentication authority—facilitates interoperability between different eID providers on the one hand and 
relying parties on the other hand. This possibility will here be exemplified with the Norwegian eID portal 
(“ID-porten”). Within the Norwegian eGovernment context, this portal is a key enabler for 
interoperability of eIDs from the private and the public sectors. This is to say that a range of 
governmental service providers (i.e., relying parties) can use the ID portal to authenticate52 their users, 
who may choose among several available eIDs issued by private-sector and public-sector entities.  
In the following I will briefly introduce the portal model as it may be experienced from the 
perspective of an end-user. This description will omit most of the technical details that are necessary to 
make the model work and will rather focus on the overall structure and the underlying governance model. 
A user who wishes to authenticate herself to a governmental service provider (for example, the tax 
authorities) participating in this scheme may pick one of several pre-selected eIDs. In practice, all 
inhabitants have access to the official Norwegian government-issued ID called “MyID”, and many may in 
addition hold eIDs issued by the private sector. Once the user chooses an eID, the ID portal handles the 
authentication and communicates the result of the authentication to the relying party. This is done through 
an “SAML token”53 that identifies the user (based on the national identification number) and includes 
information on the kind of eID used, as well as the assurance level of that eID. The latter is essentially a 
value between 1 and 4, where level 4 denotes the highest assurance an eID can offer.54  
The governance framework for the Norwegian ID portal is based on contracts between the portal 
provider (the Norwegian eGovernment agency “Difi”55) and two sets of stakeholders, namely relying 
parties and eID providers.  
First, there is the contractual relationship between Difi and eGovernment service providers—i.e., the 
relying parties. Any eGovernment service provider (such as the tax authority) wishing to use the ID portal 
needs to sign a standard “collaboration agreement” with Difi. This agreement not only includes the rights 
and obligations of the parties, but also lays down a basic governance framework for the eID portal. 
Overall, the governance of the ID portal is dominated by Difi, who finances the portal, retains the overall 
control over the portal and holds all rights. However, there are a number of collaborative organs with 
representation from relying parties. The highest degree of influence is vested on the “Advisory Board”, 
formed by representatives from relying parties (selected by Difi). This board has a central role, inter alia, 
in advising on possible changes to the collaboration agreement. In addition, all relying parties may 
participate in the “Users Council”, an organ that deliberates on issues prior to decisions of the Advisory 
Board. It should be emphasised that eID providers are not represented on the Users Council, but they can 
be invited to its meetings. In addition, there are other governance structures, such as the “Forum for 
Integration and Security” and the “Forum for User Support”, and both can be attended by representatives 
from relying parties. The institutional framework put into place by the collaboration agreement is perhaps 
the clearest example of a governance model for interoperable eIDs. However, in order to assess the 
complete picture of this framework, we also need to take into account the roles of eID providers. 
A second set of contractual relations exists between Difi and eID providers participating in the portal. 
These contracts were not available for the research purposes, but from publicly available information it is 
apparent these contracts were awarded following a request for proposals addressed to several eID 
                                                 
52
 To my knowledge, the current ID portal facilitates authentication only, but it is intended that future versions also 
will allow for functionality for signature and encryption. 
53
 In essence, the ID portal is uses SAML tokens using the Security Assertion Mark-up Language, an XML-based 
open standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data. 
54
 This scale and the criteria for assurance levels regarding authentication and non-repudiation are defined in a an 
official guideline entitled “Rammeverk for autentisering og uavviselighet i elektronisk kommunikasjon med og i 
offentlig sektor: Retningslinjer for offentlige virksomheter som tilrettelegger elektroniske tjenester og samhandling 
på nett”, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/dok/lover-og-regler/retningslinjer/2008/rammeverk-for-
autentisering-og-uavviseli.html?id=505958.  
55
 The Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Difi), www.difi.no (last visited 10 November 2011). 
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providers. The requirements used to select eID providers seemed to have emphasised both the eIDs’ 
capabilities56 and their assurance levels (on a scale from 1 to 4, as mentioned above).  
Once an eID provider is granted access to the ID portal, the principle of non-discrimination applies. 
According to this principle, relying parties may not discriminate between eIDs that participate in the 
portal. In essence, relying parties may thus only select a required assurance level—based on their security 
needs asserted in a risk assessment—and if an eID provider fulfils these requirements, this eID provider 
cannot be excluded by that relying party. 
10. Concluding remarks 
Could this example of an eID portal be used as a blueprint for governing interoperability in Europe and 
beyond? It may be the case that existing eIDs in Europe are too heterogeneous to be incorporated in a 
single hub. However, this example illustrates fairly clearly that there are alternatives to creating a single 
and all-encompassing European eID if one wishes to facilitate interoperability in Europe.57 Rather than 
offering European citizens and others yet another eID (for European use), we should consider the 
alternative of governing authentication processes based on a selection of existing eIDs. Of course, the 
model raises many new questions, such as who might establish such a portal, and how it should be 
governed. In my view, a governance framework for a potential European eID portal should go beyond the 
participative model selected in Norway and also encompass other stakeholders, such as eID providers, 
other intermediaries and perhaps also end-users and their representations in civil society organizations. 
Moreover, if the intention is to ensure eID interoperability also for non-governmental actors, the private 
sector should definitely be incorporated into the governance framework. The advantage of the eID hub 
model is its potential openness, which could potentially be used to encompass not only European eIDs, 
but perhaps even allow sufficient flexibility to facilitate interoperability with other non-European eIDs in 
the future. At the same time it has to be acknowledged that the model also may involve new legal 
challenges related to, for example, compliance and liability.  
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